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FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT:
UNCONSTITUTIONAL WARRANT CRITERIA
PERMIT WIRETAPPING IF A
POSSIBILITY OF
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM IS FOUND
This Comment examines the warrant criteria established in the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 as applied to per-
sons who may be international terrorists. The Act permits elec-
tronic surveillance if a possibility of international terrorism is
found. The author concludes that the Act's warrant criteria are
unconstitutional under the fourth amendment.
INTRODUCTION
In October of 1978 Congress passed the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act (FISA).1 This legislation attempts to limit the
executive's power to authorize warrantless electronic surveillance
of foreign powers.2 The Act requires government officials to ob-
tain a warrant from a specially designated court 3 before wiretap-
ping persons acting on behalf of foreign powers. 4 However, a
finding of probable cause to believe criminal activity or activity
harmful to the nation's security has been taking place is not re-
1. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. I No. 95-511, § 101,
92 Stat. 1783 (codified at 50 U.S.C_.A §§ 1801-1811 (West Supp. 1979)).
2. See S. REP. No. 95-604, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. at 8 (1977) (The Foreign Intelli-
gence Surveillance Act is "designed... to curb the practice by which the Execu-
tive Branch may conduct warrantless electronic surveillance on its own unilateral
determination that national security justifies it."). See also S. REP. No. 95-701, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1978); H.R. REP. No. 1283, Pt. I, 95th Cong, 2d Sess. (1978).
3. 50 U.S.C.A. § 1803 (West Supp. 1979).
4. 50 U.S.C.A. § 1804 (West Supp. 1979).
(a) "Foreign power" means-
(1) a foreign government or any component thereof, whether or not
recognized by the United States;
(2) a faction of a foreign nation or nations, not substantially composed
of United States persons;
(3) an entity that is openly acknowledged by a foreign government or
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quired for issuance of a warrant.5 Nor is a reasonable suspicion of
objectionable activity required.6 Rather, if the person to be
tapped (hereinafter the target) is a United States citizen or resi-
dent alien, the special court need only find probable cause to be-
lieve that the target "may" be involved in clandestine intelligence
gathering activities on behalf of a foreign power that are violative
of federal criminal law.7 If the target is a nonresident alien, the
special court need only find probable cause to believe that the tar-
get "may" be engaged in clandestine intelligence activities on be-
half of a foreign power that are "contrary to the interests of the
United States."8
After briefly discussing the history giving rise to FISA, this
Comment will explore the constitutionality of FISA's warrant cri-
teria as applied to persons who may be international terrorists. It
will be shown that the warrant criteria are unconstitutional.
Before delving into the analysis, however, the modern threat of
governments to be directed and controlled by such foreign government or
governments;
(4) a group engaged in international terrorism or activities in prepara-
tion therefore;
(5) a foreign based political organization, not substantially composed
of United States persons, or
(6) an entity that is directed and controlled by a foreign government or
governments.
50 U.S.C.A. § 1801 (a) (1)-(6) (West Supp. 1979).
5. See 50 U.S.C.A. § 1805(a) (West Supp. 1979).
6. Id.
7. 50 U.S.C.A. §§ 1801(b), (a) (3) (A) (West Supp. 1979). The examining court
must also find that:
(1) the President has authorized the Attorney General to approve ap-
plications for electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence information;
(2) the application has been made by a Federal Officer and approved
by the Attorney General;
(3)....
(B) each of the facilities or places at which electronic surveil-
lance is directed is being used, or about to be used, by a foreign
power or an agent of a foreign power;
(4) the proposed minimization procedures meet the definition of mini-
mization procedures under [50 U.S.C.A. § 1804]; and
(5) the application which has been filed contains all statements and
certifications required by [50 U.S.C.A. § 1804] and, if the target is a United
States person, the certification or certifications are not clearly erroneous
50 U.S.C.A. § 1805(a) (West Supp. 1979). The certifications required by § 1804 in-
volve statements that the information sought is foreign intelligence information
and that such information cannot reasonably be obtained by normal investigative
techniques. 50 U.S.C.A. § 1804(a) (7) (West Supp. 1979). It seems unlikely that a
warrant would be denied on the basis that a required certification is "clearly erro-
neous" when one considers the heavy burden that is ordinarily required for a
showing that a finding is "clearly erroneous." See C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL
CouRTs § 96 at 479 (3d ed. 1976).
8. 50 U.S.C.A. §§ 1801(b), 1805(a) (3) (A) (West Supp. 1979).
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terrorism and the executive department's ability to uproot that
threat will be discussed.
The scope of this Comment is limited to the FISA provisions
that involve electronic surveillance of persons who may be inter-
national terrorists because these sections present the greatest
danger to our privacy. Under the Act, a suspected group of inter-
national terrorists is a "foreign power" for purposes of invoking
FISA's lax warrant provisions even though the group consists en-
tirely of United States citizens.9 This concern for United States
citizens' privacy must not, however, belittle the importance of
preserving the privacy rights of persons who are aliens. The
fourth amendment 10 is applicable to persons who are not United
States citizens." Moreover, if the privacy interests of aliens are
excessively infringed upon through the use of electronic surveil-
lance, there will be direct and adverse consequences for the pri-
vacy rights of American citizens who are speaking with monitored
aliens by means of instruments that are tapped.'
2
9. See 50 U.S.C.A. § 1801 (a) (1)-(6) (West Supp. 1979). In order for persons
not suspected of international terrorism to be a "foreign power," they must be ei-
ther directed and controlled by a foreign government or "not substantially com-
posed of" United States citizens or resident aliens. Id.
FISA applies to persons suspected of international, not domestic, terrorism.
What differentiates international from domestic terrorism is that the former tran-
scends national boundaries in some way. Surveillance of wholly domestic organi-
zations that are believed to be engaged in, or preparing for, acts of domestic
terrorism is apparently governed by Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Streets Act of 1968. On the bases of United States v. United States District
Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972), which held that the warrantless wiretapping of wholly
domestic organizations for national security purposes was unconstitutional, and
Congress' failure to enact a statute that prescribes a warrant procedure for the
tapping of such organizations, it can safely be asserted that Title III is applicable
to surveillance of wholly domestic organizations.
10. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
11. Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217 (1960) (fourth amendment search and
seizure principles are applicable to the search of a hotel room occupied by an
alien suspected of espionage); United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir.,
1974) ("It is beyond dispute that an alien may invoke the Fourth Amendment's
protection against an unreasonable search conducted in the United States.").
12. Information regarding contacts between members of Congress and for-
eign officials was picked up by FBI wiretaps and bugging devices and for-
warded to Presidents Johnson and Nixon ....
* ' * None of the legislators was the direct target ... but.., instead
they were overheard 'through the bureau's coverage of certain foreign es-
tablishments in Washington....'
Such eavesdropping is an example of a situation in which 'even properly
authorized electronic surveillance directed against foreign targets ...
may result in possible abuses involving American Citizens.'
N.Y. Times, May 10, 1976, at 14, col. 4. See also Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act of 1977" Hearings on S. 1566 Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Laws and Pro-
THE DILEMMA
Modern terrorism is different from that of earlier ages in a very
important respect. Today's rapidly developing technology has
provided terrorists with a great deal of power.13 Modern civiliza-
tion has established a communications system that disseminates
worldwide news of terrorists' acts,14 has provided transport facili-
ties that abet terrorists' ability to abscond, 15 and has centralized
large numbers of persons in structures vulnerable to attack.16
Most importantly, technology has produced sophisticated weap-
ons to which terrorists have access17 and has helped create a cli-
mate attuned to terrorism.' 8 This increased power has
contributed to the CIA's assessment that international terrorism
will increase in the future19 and commentators' beliefs that the
world is entering an "Age of Terrorism."20
Anti-terrorism involves two strategies. The first requires that
cedures of the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 91-92 (1977) [hereinafter cited as
1977 Judiciary Committee Hearings].
13. See W. LINEBERRY, THE STRUGGLE AGAINST TERRORISM 37 (1977), Feary, In-
ternational Terrorism, 74 DEP'T OF ST. Bum.- 394, 395 (1976); Frank, International
Legal Action Concerning Terrorism, 1 TERRORISM 187, 188 (1978).
14. W. LINEBERRY, THE STRUGGLE AGAINST TERRORISM 37 (1977); Feary, Inter.
national Terrorism, 74 DEP'T OF ST. BULL. 394, 395 (1976).
15. Id.
16. Franck, International Legal Action Concerning Terrorism, 1 TERRoRIsM
187, 188 (1970).
17. It is generally conceded that individuals or groups with certain scientific
and engineering skills could fashion a crude nuclear bomb with commercially
available equipment plus the requisite amount of enriched uranium or plutonium.
M. WLLRIcH, and T. TAYLOR, NUCLEAR THE RISKS AND SAFEGUARDS 13-21 (1974).
See Smith, The Plutonium Society: Deterrence and Inducement Factors, 41 AL-
BANY L. REv. 251 (1977). This nuclear threat, however, must not overshadow the
persistent danger of other types of advanced weaponry falling into the hands of
terrorists. On September 5, 1973, police arrested five Arab terrorists preparing to
shoot down a jetliner with two SA-7 heat-seeking missiles, each to be fired from a
light shoulder launcher. W. LINEBERRY, THE STRUGGLE AGAINST TERRORISM 47
(1977). See also Javits, International Terrorism: Apathy Exacerbates the Problem,
1 TERRORISM 111, 112 (1978).
18. Because wars of aggression against the superpowers and other developed
nations by smaller underdeveloped countries are usually expensive and long in
duration, the possibility of small nations resorting to terrorism for purposes of co-
ercing large powers must be given credence. The taking hostage of Americans in
Iran by militant students with the support of the Iranian government is a startling
example of the use of terrorism by a weaker nation against a superpower. See
N.Y. Times, Nov. 25, 1979, § 4, at 1. See generally Milbank, International and Transo
national Terrorism: Diagnosis and Prognosis, CIA RESEARCH STUDY 2 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as CIA RESEARCH STUDY]. It has also been cogently suggested
that the U.S.S.R. may use, or is using, surrogate terrorist techniques as an indirect
means of warcraft against the West. See generally Sterling, The Terrorist Network,
ATLANTIc, Nov., 1978 at 32.
19. See CIA RESEARCH STUDY, supra note 18, at 4-5.
20. CONTROL OF TERRORISM: INTERNATIONAL DOcUtMvENTS ix (Y. Alexander, M.
Browne, and A. Nanes eds. 1979).
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the public not be informed about the commission of the terrorists'
overt act of destruction or victimization. Since terrorists' power is
based on the fearful response to an act,2 1 their leverage will not
develop if the response is contained. That is, if the public does
not experience fear, terrorism is negligible as a political force.
There are two problems with this strategy. As a practical matter,
today's alert and free media makes it difficult to prevent dissemi-
nation of news about the overt act of destruction.22 In addition,
this approach does nothing to prevent the terrorists' initial act of
victimization. The second anti-terrorist strategy requires preven-
tion of the act of violence. Because terrorists have the ability to
commit devastating acts,23 this latter strategy is obviously the
sounder.
Active intelligence gathering is the most effective means by
which initial acts of terrorism can be prevented.24 Although intel-
ligence work involves many techniques, 25 one of the most fruitful
is that of wiretapping,26 for it can acquire vast amounts of knowl-
edge. Persons using the monitored line have no notice that a
search is being conducted as they speak and all conversations, 27
inculpatory and exculpatory, are recorded.28 Indeed, because of
the difficulty of limiting the scope of a wiretap it has been sug-
gested that electronic surveillance is inherently violative of the
21. See CIA RESEARCH STuDy, supra note 18, at 8.
22. See Alexander, Terrorism and the Media, 2 TERRORISM 55 (1979).
23. "U.S. Army Special Forces exercises have shown that nuclear weapons
storage areas can be penetrated successfully without detection despite guards,
fences, and sensors. Their example could obviously be followed by a daring and
well-organized terrorist organization." Beres, Terrorism and the Nuclear Threat in
the Middle East, 70 CURRENT HIsT. 27 (1976).
24. Alexander, Terrorism and the Media, 2 TERRORISM 55 (1979); Feary, Inter-
national Terrorism, 74 DEP'T OF ST. BuLL. 395, 396 (1976); Kerstetter, Terrorism and
Intelligence, 3 TERRORISM 109 (1979).
25. Examples include infiltration and mail opening. SENATE SELECT COMMIT-
TEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVI-
TIES AND THE RIGHTS OF AMERICANS, S. REP. No. 94-755, Bk. nI 94th Cong., 2d Sess.,
31, 40 (1976).
26. See generally M. BRENTON, THE PRIVACY INVADERS (1964); M. PAULSEN, THE
PROBLEMS OF ELECTRONIC EAVESDROPPING (1977).
27. Statistics released by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts show
that the average court-ordered federal wiretap in 1976 involved the interception of
1,038 separate conversations between 58 persons over a period of an average of
three weeks. 1977 Judiciary Committee Hearings, supra note 12, at 74.
28. Minimization procedures that attempt to limit as far as possible the pri-
vacy invasion from electronic surveillance have been largely unsuccessful. See
Shapiro, The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act: Legislative Balancing of Na-
tional Security and the Fourth Amendment, 15 HARv. J. LEGIS. 118, 195 (1978).
fourth amendment as a "general" search.29
The threat to civil liberties posed by wiretapping was recog-
nized by Justice Brandeis in his dissent in Olmstead v. United
States,30 when he declared that "writs of assistance and general
warrants are but puny instruments of tyranny compared to wire-
tapping."3' The danger wiretapping presents to civil liberties 32 in
the context of preventing international terrorism brings us to the
gravamen of this Comment: the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act of 1978.33
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT (FISA)
In 1940 President Roosevelt issued a memorandum to the Attor-
ney General stating that warrantless electronic surveillance
would be proper under the Constitution when "grave matters in-
volving defense of the nation" were at stake.34 The Attorney Gen-
eral, pursuant to Roosevelt's direction, began "to secure
information by listening devices [directed at] the... communi-
cations of persons suspected of subversive activities .... -35 The
practice embodied in Roosevelt's memo was continued in succes-
sive administrations.
3 6
The United States Supreme Court has not ruled on the consti-
tutionality of executive authorization of warrantless wiretapping
of foreign powers. Katz v. United States37 held that electronic
surveillance conducted on behalf of law enforcement is subject to
fourth amendment restraints. 38 The question of whether the
fourth amendment is applicable to wiretaps conducted for na-
29. 1977 Judiciary Committee Hearings, supra note 12, at 77 (statement of
John Shattuck, A.C.L.U.).
30. 277 U.S. 438 (1927).
31. 277 U.S. 471, 476 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
32. See generally 1977 Judiciary Committee Hearings, supra note 12, at 2 (dis-
cussion of wiretapping abuses aimed at National Security Advisor Morton
Halperin and civil rights leader Martin Luther King, Jr.).
33. 50 U.S.C.A. §§ 1801-1811 (West Supp. 1979).
34. See H.R. REP. No. 95-1283, Pt. I, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1978); S. REP. No.
95-604, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 7-8 (1977).
35. H.R. REP. No. 95-1283, Pt. I, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1978); S. REP. No. 95-
604, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 7-8 (1977).
36. "Since the early 1930's, intelligence agencies have frequently wiretapped
and bugged American citizens without the benefit of a judicial warrant." SENATE
SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTEL-
UGENCE ACTIVITIES AND THE RIGHTS OF AMERICANS, S. REP. No. 94-755, Bk. II, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess., 12 (1976).
37. 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (police had bugged a public phone booth and overheard
defendant's conversations).
38. "[A]ntecedent justification [is] a procedure that we hold to be a constitu-
tional precondition of the kind of electronic surveillance involved in this case." Id.
at 359.
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tional security purposes was explicitly reserved.3 9 In United
States v. United States District Court40 the Supreme Court stated
that electronic surveillance of wholly domestic organizations
41 in
the name of national security is subject to judicial authorization.
The Court refused, however, to extend its ruling to wiretaps in-
volving foreign powers.42 Neither the disposition of Katz nor that
of District Court required resolving the question of whether an
executive power to unilaterally wiretap foreign powers, and their
suspected agents, is constitutional. The Supreme Court has, how-
ever, been petitioned for purposes of addressing the specific is-
sue. In all cases certiorari was denied.43
The Supreme Court's reluctance to tackle the issue resembles a
similar hesitancy on behalf of Congress prior to enactment of
FISA. Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets
Act of 196844 was the first major statutory scheme dealing with
wiretaps. 45 It permits issuance of a warrant allowing electronic
surveillance if probable cause requirements are fulfilled.4
6 The
warrant procedures, however, are expressly inapplicable to wire-
taps involving national security.4 7 Indeed, FISA represents the
first attempt by a coordinate branch of the national government to
39. "Whether safeguards other than prior authorization by a magistrate would
satisfy the Fourth Amendment in a situation involving the national security is a
question not presented by this case." Id. at 358 n.23.
40. 407 U.S. 297 (1972) (United States charged anti-war demonstrators with de-
stroying and conspiring to destroy government property).
41. "We use the term 'domestic organization' in this opinion to mean a group
or organization (whether formally or informally constituted) composed of citizens
of the United States and which has no significant connection with a foreign power,
its agents or agencies." Id. at 309 n.8.
42. "The instant case requires no judgment on the scope of the President's
surveillance power with respect to the activities of foreign powers, within or with-
out this country." Id. at 308.
43. Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944
(1976); United States v. Butenko, 494 F.2d 593 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Iva-
nov v. United States, 419 U.S. 881 (1974); United States v. Brown, 484 F.2d 418
(1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 960 (1974).
44. 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (1976), as amended by Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, tit. I, § 101, 92 Stat. 1783.
45. Section 605 of the Federal Communications Act of 1934, tit. VI, § 605, 48
Stat. 1103 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1976)), was the first federal wiretap statute.
It proscribed the interception and divulgence of wire communications without the
consent of the sender, but it did not prohibit the mere interception of communica-
tions.
46. See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(a)-(d) (1976).
47. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(3) (1976) (repealed by Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, tit. 11, § 201(c), 92 Stat. 1797).
limit the ability of the executive to authorize warrantless elec-
tronic surveillance of suspected foreign powers and their agents.
FISA establishes a classification between United States persons
and non-United States persons.48 The warrant procedure for the
former is more rigorous than that for the latter. "United States
person" refers to United States citizens and resident aliens.
49
Non-United States person includes visiting foreign nationals.50
The special court shall enter an ex parte order approving the
electronic surveillance of a non-United States person if there is
probable cause to believe that the target "may" engage in "clan-
destine intelligence activities... contrary to the interests of the
United States" on behalf of a foreign power.51 Certain other find-
ings must also be made.5 2 This standard has the potential to
bring various types of innocuous conduct within its purview. The
judge need not find reasonable grounds to believe the target
presents a danger to the security of the United States or is en-
gaged in criminal activity. Moreover, the Act fails to give defini-
tions for, or examples of, "clandestine intelligence activities" that
are "contrary to the interests of the United States."53
A warrant approving surveillance of a United States citizen or
resident alien shall be issued if there is probable cause to believe
the target may engage in "clandestine intelligence gathering activ-
ities" on behalf of a foreign power that are violative of the crimi-
nal statutes of the United States.54 The court must also find that
certain other requirements have been fulfilled.55 Again, "clandes-
tine intelligence gathering activities" is undefined,56 although the
Act does provide the amorphous admonition that conduct pro-
tected by the first amendment 57 does not fall within the purview
of such activities. 58 This standard is more demanding than that
applied to non-United States persons in one significant respect.
In the case of non-United States persons, the judge's findings
need not include the possibility of criminal activity. With respect
to United States persons, however, it must be shown that the tar-
get's activity "may" involve criminal activity.
48. 50 U.S.C.A. § 1801(b) (1) and (2) (West Supp. 1979). See generally, Peirce,
Does the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 Infringe the Fourth Amend-
ment Rights of Nonresident Aliens?, 3 ASILS INT'L. L J. 91 (1979).
49. 50 U.S.C-. § 1801(i) (West Supp. 1979).
50. 50 U.S.C.A. § 1801(b)(1) (West Supp. 1979).
51. 50 U.S.C.A. §§ 1801(b) (1) (B), 1805(a) (3) (A) (West Supp. 1979).
52. See note 7 supra.
53. See 50 U.S.CA. § 1801 (West Supp. 1979).
54. 50 U.S.C-A. §§ 1801(b) (2) (A), 1805(a) (3) (A) (West Supp. 1979).
55. See note 7 supra.
56. See 50 U.S.CA. § 1801 (a) (3) (West Supp. 1979).
57. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
58. 50 U.S.C.A. § 1805(a) (3) (A) (West Supp. 1979).
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Issuance of a warrant 9 based on activity that "may" be criminal
or "may" be contrary to the interests of the United States, de-
pending on the target's status, permits electronic surveillance on
the basis of a possibility.60 To allow governmental intrusion on
such a basis is unreasonable and, thus, violative of the fourth
amendment because there is almost always a possibility that a
given form of conduct will involve objectionable activity.61 When
X drives his automobile on the highway, there is a possibility that
he is in the process of delivering a bomb. When X is speaking
with his friends there is a possibility that he is discussing the
commission of a planned hyjacking. Indeed, warrant criteria de-
manding the demonstration of only a possibility require that the
judge be nothing more than a rubber stamp.
CONSTrrUTIONALTrY OF THE FISA STANDARD
The fourth amendment protects people from unreasonable
searches and seizures by the state--a right "basic to a free soci-
ety."62 The policy behind this limitation on government is "to
keep the state out of [areas where a reasonable expectation of
59. Electronic surveillance may be placed on anyone, regardless of their sta-
tus, if the Attorney General determines that an "emergency situation" exists. In
such a case, a warrant must be procured within 24 hours after the surveillance is
instituted. 50 U.S.C.A. § 1805(e) (West Supp. 1979).
60. In the context of FISA, "may" means "expressing... a possibility." See
THE OXFORD UNIVERSAL DICnONARY 1221 (3d ed. 1955).
61. One commentator who found the FISA issuance criteria constitutional as a
proper balancing of national security and the fourth amendment focused on
whether it was constitutionally permissible to issue warrants when there is proba-
ble cause to believe the target is engaged in activity that does not necessarily in-
volve crime. See Shapiro, The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act: Legislative
Balancing of National Security and the Fourth Amendment, 15 HARv. J. LEGIS. 119,
146-67 (1977). This is not the crucial issue in determining the constitutionality of
FISA. Rather, the determinitive question is whether a possibility of undesirable
activity that may or may not be criminal is sufficient for issuance of a warrant.
See text accompanying notes 72-82 infra.
FISA states that the judge shall issue a warrant if he finds "probable cause to
believe that the target ... may" be engaged in certain activity. 50 U.S.C.A.
§§ 1805(a), 1801(b) (West Supp. 1979). Use of the term "probable cause" does not
cure the problem caused by the term "may." Resort to mathematics is illustrative.
Assume a scale of 0 to 1 where certainty=l, probable cause=.75, justifiable suspi-
cion (as defined in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)) =.50, and possibility=.25. When
the "probable cause. , . may" language of FISA is presented in terms of this scale
we get .75 X .25 or .18. The product of .18, which is less than possibility (.25), indi-
cates that the use of the term "probable cause" (.75) actually makes the FISA war-
rant criteria require less than a possibility.
62. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1938).
privacy is enjoyed] until it has reason to believe that a specific
crime has been or is being committed .... ,,63 By authorizing ex-
ecutive officials to institute electronic surveillance whenever the
special court agrees that there is a possibility of criminal activity
or activity contrary to the interests of the United States, FISA
fails to heed adequately the fourth amendment policy of preserv-
ing privacy and is, therefore, unconstitutional.
The Supreme Court has permitted governmental invasions of
privacy in only a few instances in the absence of a finding of prob-
able cause.64 A two-pronged test has been developed by the
Supreme Court for determining when a finding of probable cause
is not necessary for a search to be constitutional. 65 The test re-
quires that there be a strong public interest in conducting the
search and that the search be limited.66 It has been argued by the
Justice Department that the FISA standard satisfies this test.
67
Such an argument is flawed. Although the first requirement is
fulfilled because there is certainly a strong public interest in
preventing acts of international terrorism, the second require-
ment is not satisfied. The scope of the search is not limited. In
fact, electronic surveillance is one of the broadest forms of pri-
vacy invasion known.68
It has been suggested that Supreme Court dictum in United
63. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 59 (1967).
64. The probable cause exception permitted in FISA must be distinguished
from the exception to the fourth amendment that allows a search in the absence of
a warrant. Dispensing with the procedural requirement of procuring a warrant, al-
though significant, Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971), is not as
threatening to privacy as the disregarding of the substantive requirement of prob-
able cause. With the former the danger lies in eliminating the judgment of the
neutral magistrate as to whether probable cause exists; with the latter a greater
danger lies in removing the traditional basis for state intrusion altogether.
65. In Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 532 (1967), it was held that adminis-
trative inspection of housing facilities was subject to the warrant requirements of
the fourth amendment. The Supreme Court declined, however, to make a finding
of probable cause necessary for issuance of a warrant. This latter part of the hold-
ing had a twofold basis: the strong public interest in eliminating unsafe and dan-
gerous housing conditions and the limited invasion that such inspections pose to
citizens' privacy. A similar analysis was employed in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1
(1968). Therein, the Supreme Court stated that a governmental "stop and frisk" of
a person when there is a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, but no probable
cause, is constitutional. The decision was based on the public interest in protect-
ing police officers and the limited scope of the search. Other Supreme Court deci-
sions permitting governmental intrusions in the absence of probable cause have
used the reasoning of Camara and Terry. See, e.g., United States v. Brigoni-
Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 881 (1975).
66. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 532
(1967).
67. 1977 Judiciary Committee Hearing, supra note 12, at 15.
68. See notes 25-28 and accompanying text supra.
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States v. United States District Court69 may provide a constitu-
tional justification for the FISA warrant criteria.70 In District
Court the Supreme Court recognized that the policy of preserving
privacy may have to be compromised when in conflict with the
policy of maintaining the nation's security. The case involved a
criminal action charging certain persons with destroying or con-
spiring to destroy government property. The defendants con-
tended that evidence obtained by the government through
warrantless electronic surveillance must be disclosed in order for
suppression motions to be brought. The Supreme Court agreed
and held that wiretaps placed on wholly domestic organizations
for purposes of domestic security are subject to prior judicial ap-
proval. Although the Court did not address the question of
whether electronic surveillance relating to foreign affairs was sub-
ject to the fourth amendment, an aspect of the District Court
analysis is pertinent to determining the constitutionality of the
FISA standard. The Court noted that because there are "poten-
tial distinctions between Title Ill criminal surveillances and those
involving domestic security, Congress may wish to consider pro-
tective standards for the latter which differ from those already
prescribed for crimes in Title I."71 This statement permits the
inference that a warrant procedure less rigorous than that in Title
III is permissible when surveillance relating to foreign powers is
contemplated. This language cannot, however, be used as a justi-
fication for FISA's warrant criteria. District Court stands for the
proposition that the warrant criteria of Title III can be watered
down when electronic surveillance relating to the nation's secur-
ity is at issue, but it does not support the proposition that the
fourth amendment's requirement of reasonableness can be aban-
doned when such surveillance is instituted. And, as shown above,
warrant criteria based on a possibility are unreasonable.
Two Circuits have held that a probability of criminal activity
need not be shown when the objective of the electronic surveil-
lance is to gather intelligence relating to foreign powers.72 In
69. 407 U.S. 297 (1972).
70. Shapiro, The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act: Legislative Balancing
of National Security and the Fourth Amendment 15 HA~v. J. LEGIS. 119, 146-47
(1977).
71. 407 U.S. at 322.
72. Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944
(1976); United States v. Butenko, 494 F.2d 593 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 881
(1974).
United States v. Butenko73 the Third Circuit upheld a conviction
for conspiring to transmit to a foreign government information re-
lating to the national defense of the United States. Some of the
government's evidence had been procured through the use of
warrantless electronic surveillance. Although the court held that
the fourth amendment is applicable to wiretaps instituted to ob-
tain information relating to foreign powers, the fourth amend-
ment was held not to require prior judicial approval of the
wiretap. Rather, the court decided that there need only be a post
hoc determination of reasonableness if the defendant moves for
divulgence. In determining "reasonableness" the court held that
a finding of probable criminal activity was not necessary because
the "primary purpose of these searches is to secure foreign intelli-
gence information" and not to uproot crime.74
In Zweibon v. Mitchell7 5 members of the Jewish Defense
League, which was demonstrating against Soviet emigration pol-
icy, brought an action against the Attorney General and the FBI
to recover damages sustained as a result of alleged unlawful elec-
tronic surveillance of the League's New York headquarters. The
District of Columbia Circuit's analysis indicates that all foreign
security wiretaps must be subject to prior judicial approval.76 The
court's holding, however, was not so broad. It found that a war-
rant must be secured before electronic surveillance for foreign in-
telligence purposes can be authorized unless the target is an
agent of, or acting in collaboration with, a foreign power.77 By re-
quiring prior judicial approval, instead of permitting a post hoc
determination of reasonableness, Mitchell differs significantly
from Butenko.7 8 There is, however, an important similarity be-
73. 494 F.2d 593 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. denied sub noma. Ivanov v. United States,
419 U.S. 881 (1974).
74. 494 F.2d at 605.
75. 516 F.2d 594 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976).
76. The court cogently dispensed with each of the following reasons the gov-
ernment submitted in support of immunizing such electronic surveillance from
the fourth amendment: (1) lack of judicial competence to deal with foreign affairs
data; (2) danger of security leaks; (3) the fact that such surveillance is not being
used for criminal prosecutions, but only for "strategic" intelligence gathering; (4)
the possibility that the delay involved in the warrant procedure might result in
substantial harm to the national security; and (5) the fact that the administrative
burden on the courts might be enormous. 516 F.2d at 602, 633-52. But see United
States v. Hung, No. 78-5177 (4th Cir. July 17, 1980). See generally Note, Foreign Se-
curity Surveillance-Balancing Executive Power and the Fourth Amendment, 45
FORDHAm L. REV. 1179, 1199 (1977); Note, The Fourth Amendment and Judicial Re-
view of Foreign Intelligence Wiretapping: Zweibon v. Mitchell, 45 GEo. WAsH. L.
REv. 55 (1976).
77. 516 F.2d at 602.
78. Another difference between the two cases involves the determination of
reasonableness. Under Butenko the surveillance is to be deemed reasonable if its
primary purpose is to secure foreign intelligence information. 494 F.2d at 606. Un-
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tween the two cases. Neither decision requires the examining
court to consider the probability of criminal activity in determin-
ing the legality of the contemplated, or already instituted, elec-
tronic surveillance.7 9 Butenko and Mitchell cannot, however, be
used as a constitutional justification for the FISA warrant criteria.
The Butenko-Mitchell doctrine is not germane to the crucial issue
that must be resolved to determine the constitutionality of FISA's
warrant criteria. The crucial issue is whether a warrant can issue
on the basis of a possibility, not whether evidence of criminality
is required for issuance.
In sum, it must be said that each of the available avenues for a
constitutional justification of FISA's warrant criteria is plagued
with roadblocks. The two-pronged test developed by the Supreme
Court that requires a strong public interest and a limited search
before the probable cause requirement can be abandoned is not
satisfied by FISA. Electronic surveillance is not a limited form of
search. In United States v. United States District Court8O
Supreme Court dictum indicates that the rigorous probable cause
requirements of Title I can be mitigated, although the fourth
amendment's requirement of reasonableness cannot be aban-
doned, when the wiretap involves national security. FISA cannot
be justified by District Court because warrant criteria requiring
only a possibility of undesirable conduct are unreasonable. Fi-
nally, FISA cannot be justified by the doctrine of United States v.
Butenko 81 and Zweibon v. Mitchell.82 Butenko and Mitchell stand
for the proposition that a probability of criminal activity is not re-
quired when the object of the wiretap is not to prevent crime or
apprehend criminals. Butenko and Mitchell do not support the
idea that a warrant to wiretap can be issued on the basis of a pos-
sibility when the purpose of the surveillance is to acquire intelli-
gence relating to foreign powers.
One more point should be made. The President does not have
der Mitchell, however, reasonableness cannot be found unless the ratio of ex-
pected relevant information to irrelevant information is high. 516 F.2d at 657. The
latter test would appear to be more stringent than the former.
79. The Mitchell court stated that "it would appear to be proper to issue war-
rants ... even though evidence of crime is neither sought nor likely to be uncov-
ered." 516 F.2d at 656.
80. 407 U.S. 297 (1972).
81. 494 F.2d 594 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. denied sub nom. Ivanov v. United States,
419 U.S. 881 (1976).
82. 516 F.2d 594 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976).
the inherent power to conduct warrantless electronic surveillance
when gathering foreign intelligence. Because the FISA warrant
criteria are unconstitutional, a new statute with acceptable war-
rant criteria is needed. In United States v. Brown 83 the Fifth Cir-
cuit held that the President had authority "over and above the
Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment" to authorize warrant-
less electronic surveillance of foreign powers. 84 The decision is
based on the President's inherent power to act in foreign affairs.
Brown is erroneous. The doctrine of inherent executive power
stems from United States v. Curtiss-Wright.85 Curtiss-Wright in-
volved the constitutionality of a congressional delegation of power
to the President to declare illegal the sale of arms to certain for-
eign nations. The exercise of such a power by the President was
held to be constitutional on a twofold basis: the congressional
delegation of power coupled with the President's inherent power
to act in foreign affairs.86 The Supreme Court recognized the doc-
trine of inherent power in Curtiss-Wright as a matter of policy.
To ensure the achievement of national goals in the international
arena it was held that the President must have an independent
freedom to act in the international field.87 However, in Youngs-
town Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,88 the Supreme Court estab-
lished definite limits on the exercise of inherent executive power.
Youngstown dealt with the constitutionality of President Tru-
man's ordering of the steelworkers back to work in order to avoid
a steel shortage during the Korean War. It was held that the
President lacked the power to take such domestic action in the
absence of a delegation of power from Congress. Youngstown
stands for the doctrine that the executive cannot exercise inher-
ent power when such causes a domestic infringement of rights.
President Truman, in the absence of statutory approval, had de-
prived the steelworkers of their right to strike. Thus, under Cur-
tiss-Wright as limited by Youngstown the President does not
have the inherent power to institute warrantless wiretaps be-
cause there is a domestic infringement of privacy when one's
communications are tapped without a warrant.
But, even if the President does have the inherent power to
wiretap within the United States, there is no reason why this in-
herent executive power, like any other power of the national gov-
ernment, should not be subject to the fourth amendment. In
83. 484 F.2d 418 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 960 (1974).
84. Id. at 426.
85. 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
86. Id. at 319-20.
87. Id.
88. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
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Youngstown the Supreme Court stated that inherent executive
power must be "exercised in subordination to [other] provisions
of the Constitution."89 In Reid v. Covert90 any doubt about
whether inherent executive power was exempt from the Bill of
Rights was settled. The Supreme Court declared that executive
agreements made pursuant to inherent executive power must ob-
serve constitutional prohibitions. 91
CONCLUSION
The threat of international terrorism is real. Effective intelli-
gence gathering through electronic surveillance is one of the most
efficacious means available for preventing international terrorism
and dismantling the threat it poses. Unfortunately, overzealous
use of interception devices places privacy rights in jeopardy. In
an effort to protect citizens' and aliens' privacy from this type of
invasion, Congress passed the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act. This legislation requires, among other things, a warrant to be
obtained before the communications of persons who may be in-
ternational terrorists can be monitored. To procure a warrant to
wiretap a United States citizen or resident alien, it must be shown
that the target "may" be engaged in criminal activity on behalf of
a foreign power. To wiretap a nonresident alien it must be shown
that the target "may" be involved in activity contrary to the inter-
ests of the United States on behalf of a foreign power. Because
these criteria permit wiretapping on the basis of a mere possibil-
ity of criminal activity or activity contrary to the interests of the
United States, depending on the target's status, the Foreign Intel-
ligence Surveillance Act is unconstitutional. The peril of interna-
tional terrorism is not so omnipresent as to require such a
surrender of our privacy.
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89. 299 U.S. at 320.
90. 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
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